The Document That Tells the Story
On May 6, 2002, Larisa Muravska delivered a report to the Open Society Institute’s Arts and Culture Network Program. Its title was unassuming: Assessment/mapping of activities of the Soros Centers for Contemporary Arts. It ran to twenty-three pages plus attachments, and it was commissioned following a November 2001 decision of the program’s Sub-board. The report opens with a sentence that any forensic reader should underline: “Following the decision of its Sub-board, in November 2001, the Network Arts and Culture Program commissioned the assessment of the 19 former Soros Centers of Contemporary Arts (SCCAs).”
That number—19—is the first clue. The SCCA network had been described elsewhere as comprising twenty centers. The assessment covers nineteen. The discrepancy is not a scandal; it is a filing detail. But it is exactly the kind of detail that tells you what kind of document you are holding. This is not a celebration. It is an audit of a network that had already been spun off, and the foundation wanted to know what it had wrought.
The assessment is the primary evidence for how the Soros network built contemporary art infrastructure across Central and Eastern Europe. Not because it boasts of success—it does not—but because it records the machinery: budgets, staff counts, governance relations, sustainability targets, and the quiet admission of what it did not measure. Read as a governance document, it is more revealing than any press release.
The Institutional Timeline, From the Files
The C3 Center for Culture and Communication, successor to the Budapest SCCA, maintains a program history that reads like a chain of custody. The Soros Foundation Fine Arts Documentation Center was established in 1985 in the Budapest Mûcsarnok (Kunsthalle), as a cooperation between the Mûcsarnok and Soros Foundation Hungary. Its purpose, as the C3 page states, was to support modern Hungarian culture “which was banned or at least forced into the background by official cultural policies”—supporting artists in “counter-culture” circles through scholarships, purchases, exhibitions, and catalogues.
In 1991, the Center expanded under the name SCCA. From the end of 1991 until 1999, according to the Muravska assessment, “18 additional SCCAs were opened in 17 Central and Eastern European countries, with goals and activities similar to the Budapest SCCA: to promote, develop and support contemporary art.” The C3 page confirms the count: “From the end of 1991 until 1999, 19 additional SCCAs were opened in 17 Central and Eastern European countries.” The arithmetic is consistent: one Budapest center plus eighteen additional equals nineteen total, though the assessment’s phrasing and the C3 page’s phrasing differ slightly in how they count the Budapest predecessor.
The network functioned as part of the Soros Foundations network between 1992 and 1999, with a mission to support “the development and international exposure of contemporary art in Eastern and Central Europe, the countries of the former Soviet Union, and Central Eurasia as a vital element of an open society.” That sentence, from the C3 page, is the mission statement. The assessment is the operational record.
What the Assessment Measured—and What It Did Not
The assessment’s stated objectives were precise: “To map and evaluate current performance of these centers with the focus on relations with the national Soros foundations, quality of programs, their sustainability and public visibility.” The key questions raised by the OSI Board and the Arts and Culture Network Program Sub-board were equally precise: How do former SCCAs contribute to the development of open society values? Do they have influence in building open societies? What models of relations exist between the national foundations and SCCAs? What common problems do they face? What is their future?
Then comes the methodological admission, which is the most important paragraph in the document for anyone who wants to use it as evidence. The assessment states: “Due to its predetermined framework, the assessment utilized rather limited sources of data and information. For instance, centers’ clients/beneficiaries, partners, other donors were not involved in the assessment. Such methods of data gathering as survey, observation, and focus groups were not utilized.”
This is not a flaw to be hidden. It is the document’s own description of its scope. The assessment relied on self-assessment by SCCA directors, questionnaires from national Soros foundation executive directors, questionnaires from independent experts, semi-structured interviews, and some business and strategic plans. The report itself notes that “the objectivity of opinion of independent experts can also be questioned since some of the experts had received financial or other kind of support from the centers.”
Read this as a governance artifact, not a verdict. It is the foundation’s own account of its network, produced by a consultant commissioned by the foundation, using data gathered from the foundation’s own grantees and partners. That does not make it false. It makes it a specific kind of evidence: an internal audit with stated limits.
The Budget Table: Infrastructure in Numbers
The assessment includes a table of annual operating budgets for 2001 and staff counts. The figures are the documentary basis for any claim about infrastructure. Among the entries: Bulgaria at $531,553; Hungary at $430,000; Russia–St. Petersburg at $450,000; Estonia at $495,327; Latvia at $490,000; Slovakia at $281,400; Bosnia and Herzegovina at $264,514; Romania at $177,630; Slovenia at $179,291; Croatia at $107,000; Macedonia at $102,845; Kazakhstan at $109,497; Moldova at $62,260; Lithuania at $51,089; Ukraine–Odessa at $40,000; Yugoslavia at $76,700; Czech Republic at $170,448; Russia–Moscow at $138,200; Ukraine–Kyiv at $75,000.
These are not aggregated totals. They are individual center budgets, and they should be read as such. The range is wide: from $40,000 in Odessa to $531,553 in Bulgaria. Staff counts vary similarly: most centers had between two and six full-time staff, with Hungary and Russia–St. Petersburg employing the most. The assessment notes that many centers used part-time or contract staff, as well as volunteers.
The table is the infrastructure claim in its most concrete form. A network of nineteen centers, each with an operating budget and a staff, is an infrastructure—not in the sense of buildings and collections alone, but in the sense of payroll, programming, and administration. The assessment does not measure artistic outcomes. It measures the machinery that produces them.
The Spin-Off Clause: Independence as a Financial Target
The most consequential passage in the assessment concerns the transition. “In 1999 and 2000, following the restructuring of the Soros Foundations, all Soros Centers for Contemporary Arts started a spun-off process and were transformed into independent NGOs or like in case of Lithuania and Poland, were transferred to the public institutions.” The centers were required to present business plans “which would take into account diminishing financial support from the national Soros foundations. It was envisaged that by 2003 the centers would become self-sustainable.”
This is the clause that defeats its own purpose, or at least complicates it. The centers were spun off into independence, but the independence was defined financially: diminishing support, a business plan, a 2003 target. The assessment records the result: “From being a well-funded program with secure budget and operations, the centers have to turn into independent sustainable institutions. Most importantly, the centers are now facing a new reality – market environment and its rules.”
The assessment also notes a “prevailing tendency to reduce or shut the grant-giving programs and to run own programs and services.” This is the shift from grant-making to programming—from distributing money to producing exhibitions, publications, and events. It is a structural change, and the assessment records it without editorializing.
For fundraising and communication purposes, the new NGOs formed the association ICAN (International Contemporary Art Network), based in Amsterdam. The C3 page adds that ICAN was registered in the Netherlands as a public benefit association, with C3 as a founding member. The assessment notes that the annual ICAN meeting in December 2001 “demonstrated that the centers are very motivated to work together” but also “revealed that the centers are still not very much clear about the potential of the association.”
What the Paperwork Leaves Open
The assessment is not an independent evaluation. It was commissioned by OSI, relied on self-assessment and expert questionnaires, and explicitly excluded clients, beneficiaries, partners, and other donors. It covers nineteen of twenty centers. Its budget table is a snapshot of 2001, not a time series. It does not measure artistic quality, exhibition history, or international impact beyond what the centers reported about themselves.
What it does provide is a documentary spine for the infrastructure claim. The C3 page provides the institutional timeline. The Open Society fact sheet provides the broader philanthropic context: “in the 1990s, he dramatically expanded his support for emerging democracies in Eastern and Central Europe and South Africa.” The Open Society history page states that in 1992, George Soros began opening arts centers across Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, building on a model started in Budapest in the 1980s, forming a network of 20 centers.
These sources do not prove that the Soros network “built” Eastern Europe’s contemporary art infrastructure in any comprehensive or causal sense. They document a network of centers, their budgets, their staff, their spin-off, and their own account of their sustainability. That is enough for a forensic reading. The rest is interpretation, and it should be labeled as such.
Reading the Documents Together
The method is straightforward. Start with the assessment’s stated objectives and its stated limits. Read the budget table as a snapshot, not a total. Read the spin-off clause as a governance decision with financial terms. Read the C3 page as the institutional memory of the Budapest center. Read the Open Society fact sheet and history page as the foundation’s own framing of its philanthropic trajectory.
What emerges is not a success story or a scandal. It is a record of a foundation that built a network, funded it, assessed it, spun it off, and then commissioned an audit of what remained. The audit is candid about its limits. The budget table is specific. The spin-off clause is precise. The sustainability target is dated. These are the materials of infrastructure, and they are available to anyone who reads them.
The assessment’s own conclusion is measured: the centers “vary greatly by the size of operating budgets and number of staff,” and the “prevailing tendency is to reduce or shut the grant-giving programs and to run own programs and services.” That is the finding. The rest is paperwork.
FAQ
What is the Soros Centers for Contemporary Arts (SCCA) network?
The SCCA network was a group of contemporary art centers established by the Soros Foundations network across Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and Central Eurasia. According to the C3 page, the network functioned between 1992 and 1999, with a mission to support the development and international exposure of contemporary art as a vital element of an open society. The Muravska assessment documents nineteen former centers operating as of 2001.
When were the SCCAs established?
The predecessor, the Soros Foundation Fine Arts Documentation Center, was established in Budapest in 1985. The SCCA name was adopted in 1991. From the end of 1991 until 1999, eighteen additional SCCAs were opened in seventeen Central and Eastern European countries, according to the Muravska assessment.
What happened to the SCCAs after 1999?
In 1999 and 2000, following the restructuring of the Soros Foundations, all SCCAs began a spin-off process and were transformed into independent NGOs or, in the cases of Lithuania and Poland, transferred to public institutions. The centers were required to present business plans accounting for diminishing financial support, with a target of self-sustainability by 2003.
What was ICAN?
ICAN (International Contemporary Art Network) was an association formed by the new NGOs, mainly for fundraising and communication purposes, based in Amsterdam. According to the C3 page, it was registered in the Netherlands as a public benefit association, with C3 as a founding member.
Is the 2002 assessment an independent evaluation?
No. It was commissioned by the Open Society Institute’s Arts and Culture Network Program following a November 2001 Sub-board decision. It relied on self-assessment by SCCA directors, questionnaires from national Soros foundation executive directors, questionnaires from independent experts, and semi-structured interviews. It explicitly did not involve clients, beneficiaries, partners, or other donors, and did not use surveys, observation, or focus groups. The report itself notes that some independent experts had received financial or other support from the centers.
What do the budget figures in the assessment show?
The assessment includes a table of 2001 annual operating budgets for individual centers, ranging from $40,000 (Ukraine–Odessa) to $531,553 (Bulgaria). These are individual center budgets, not aggregated totals. They should be read as a snapshot of the network’s financial scale in 2001, not as a time series or a measure of artistic output.